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Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics: An
Examination of Applicable Legal Doctrines
I. INTRODUCTION
Although participation in athletics is an important part of
the educational process in American high schools,' only re-
cently have females been encouraged to participate in competi-
tive sports. 2 The number of females participating in
interscholastic athletics has increased dramatically in the last
decade.3 Large discrepancies continue to exist, however, in the
participation rates of female and male athletes,4 and the female
1. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORE HURDLES To CLEAR: WOMEN
AND Gnus IN COMPETITIVE ATHLETICS (1980) [hereinafter cited as MORE HUR-
DLES]. According to the Commission, the benefits of athletic participation in-
clude the promotion of good health and the development of teamwork,
cooperation, and a competitive spirit. Id. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has noted that "interscholastic activities. .. [are] today recognized...
as an important and integral facet of the.., education process." Thompson v.
Barnes, 294 Minn. 528, 535 n.11, 200 N.W.2d 921, 926 n.11 (1972).
2. In the Victorian era, females were commonly considered too weak,
fragile, and passive for rigorous exercise. Spears, The Emergence of Women in
Sport, in WOMEN'S ATHLETICS 27 (1974). In the early 1900's, many physical edu-
cators were convinced that the enthusiasm of college women for competitive
sports was both dangerous and unwomanly. E. GERBER, J. FELSHIN, P. BER.IN &
W. WYRIcK, THE AMERICAN WOMAN IN SPORT 12-13 (1974). In recent years the
major obstacle to female participation in interscholastic athletics has been ine-
quality between female and male athletic programs in the allocation of facili-
ties, equipment, practice schedules, and funding. See infra note 5 and
accompanying text.
3. In 1970-71, approximately 300,000 women, or 7.4 percent of all members
of high school athletic teams participated in interscholastic sports. NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, SPORTS PARTICIPATION SUR-
VEY (1971-72), reprinted in MORE HURDLES, supra note 1, at 13. In 1980-81, the
proportion of female athletes had increased to 31.7 percent and the number of
female participants had increased 617.9 percent to 1,853,789. NATIONAL FEDERA-
TION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, SPORTS PARTICIPATION SURVEY
(1980-81) (Telephone conversation with Warren Brown, Assistant Director of
National Federation of State High School Associations (April 30, 1982)).
4. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation;
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (1979). Statis-
tics utilized by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for
the period of 1977-78 show that, although women students accounted for 48 per-
cent of the national undergraduate enrollment, only 30 percent of the students
involved in intercollegiate athletics were women. Id. For comparable high
school statistics, see PA. COMM. FOR WOMEN, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN HIGH
SCHOOL SPORTS (1979) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as SEX DISCRIMINATION].
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who does participate continues to receive less than a fair share
of athletic resources, services, and benefits.5
The exceptional female athlete, perhaps prompted by these
program disparities as well as by heightened female interest in
competitive athletics, has increasingly attempted to participate
in male athletic programs. If barred from such competition, the
female athlete has invoked the judicial process to establish her
right to compete for a position on a male athletic team.6 Most
courts facing this question over the last decade have held that
denying a qualified female the opportunity to compete in state
supported athletics where no comparable female team exists
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.7 The enactment of Title IX to the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 supports this judicial trend by requiring equal
opportunity for male and female athletes,8 and public high
5. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (1979). HEW cited a finding of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights that colleges and universities generally pro-
vide twice the number of sports for men as they do for women. Id. HEW also
noted that male athletes receive 78 percent ($32,000) of the average annual
scholarship budget of schools while female athletes receive 22 percent ($7,000),
even though 30 percent of all athletes eligible for scholarships are women. Id.
The report also notes disparities in funding for recruitment of male and female
athletes, ratios of coaches to athletes, quality and amount of equipment, access
to facilities and practice times, publicity, medical and training facilities, and
housing and dining facilities. Id. See also SEX DiscR mNATION, supra note 4, at
9-11. Courts and commentators have stated that male athletes generally pos-
sess higher levels of athletic skill than female athletes, see, e.g., O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1306-07 (1980); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (1977), suggesting that male athletes
may be exposed to more demanding levels of competition than female athletes.
See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High
School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 666 (1981) (Jones, J., dissenting); Note, Sex
Discrimination in High School Athletics, 57 MINN. L. REV. 339, 369 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); O'Connor v. Board
of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981); Brenden v.
Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Darrin v. Gould, 85
Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1302
(8th Cir. 1973) (high school provided non-contact sports only for boys); Leffel v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (athletic association denied girls the opportunity to try out for a boys'
athletic team where no girls' team was provided); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977) (complete denial of any opportunity to play inter-
scholastic soccer violated the plaintiff's right to equal protection). See also
Fabri & Fox, The Female High School Athlete and Interscholastic Sports, 4 J. L
& EDuc. 285, 294 (1975).
8. Congress demonstrated its intent to provide equal opportunity to fe-
male and male athletes in non-contact sports with the adoption of Title IX to
the Education Amendments of 1972. Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Under Title
IX, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate both that the state provides only a
1116 [Vol. 66:1115
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schools have been compelled to focus more attention upon
their female athletic programs. As a result there has been a
marked increase in sports offerings for females.9 This recent
proliferation of female teams places the exceptional female ath-
lete in a difficult position, however, because courts have not
consistently upheld the qualified female athlete's right to try
out for a male team if her school district has established a sep-
arate female team in the same sport.o
This Note discusses the legal doctrines affecting the female
athlete's effort to establish a right to compete for a position on
a male athletic team when the school affords the athlete an op-
portunity to participate on a separate female team in the same
sport. In such circumstances, the female athlete may challenge
a separate sex program under the Federal Constitution, under
a federal civil rights statute, or under applicable state constitu-
tional or statutory provisions. This Note examines and criti-
cizes the traditional legal analysis of claims of sex
discrimination by female athletes under each of these legal
doctrines. The Note suggests that the female athletes' claims
should be resolved in light of the underlying social policies of
each doctrine to afford equal opportunity to individuals regard-
less of gender.
single sex team and that athletic opportunities have previously been limited for
her gender. See Fabri & Fox, supra note 7, at 294. For a further discussion of
the limits on the right of female athletes to compete under Title IX, see infra
notes 58-91 and accompanying text.
9. See MORE HuRDLEs, supra note 1, at 11-12.
10. The split in recent decisions results from the different treatment which
the issue receives under federal and state law. Courts addressing the issue
under federal law provide some direction for the legal practitioner. See, e.g.,
Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) (provision of separate girls' teams for contact sports was constitu-
tionally valid); Hoover v. Meikeljohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170 (D. Colo. 1977) (sepa-
rate sex teams meet the constitutional requirement of equal opportunity when
teams receive substantially equal support in substantially comparable pro-
grams). One commentator asserts that the regulations promulgated under Ti-
tle IX merely reflect the current decisional trend in federal courts to deny the
female plaintiff a right- to compete on a male team when a separate female
team exists. See Kadzielsld, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972:
Change or Continuity?, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 183, 201 (1977).
Several courts have decided under applicable state law that the female ath-
lete has a legal right to compete for a male team even if a comparable female
team exists. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877-78, 540 P.2d 882, 889
(1975) (denial of girl's right to try out for male sports team is invalid under
state equal rights provisions whether or not a "separate but equal" girls' team
exists); Commonwealth ex rel Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 52, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (1975) (same).
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11. ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE LEGAL DOCTRINES
A. FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION
Many female plaintiffs seeking the right to compete for a
position on a male high school athletic team have challenged
local prohibitions of their participation under the United States
Constitution. The athletes have most frequently argued that
separate sex interscholastic teams deny the exceptional female
athlete equal athletic opportunity in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A less commonly
litigated question is whether state denial of a female athlete's
freedom to compete for a male athletic team position violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
1. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Many female plaintiffs seeking the opportunity to compete
for a position on a male high school sports team have brought
suit under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' To maintain such a suit, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's action is sufficiently governmental in character
to be subject to the constitutional limits on state action.12 The
current standard of review under the equal protection clause
provides that state action involving a gender-based classifica-
tion will be upheld only if the classification is substantially re-
lated to the achievement of important governmental
objectives.' 3 The governmenthas the burden of defending the
11. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th
Cir. 1973); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977).
12. The state action doctrine provides that constitutional rights can only be
enforced against actions by government officials or those significantly involved
with them. Sde generally L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrUTIoNAL LAW §§ 18-1 to
18-3 (1978). Courts usually find the requisite nexus between the state and the
defendant athletic sponsor when evidence exists that the state has provided
the defendant's facilities or a major portion of its funding. See, e.g., Fortin v.
Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 346-47 (1st Cir. 1975). See generally
Note, supra note 5, at 350-51.
13. Since the 1960's, the Supreme Court has applied two different stan-
dards of review in equal protection cases depending upon the substantive area
under consideration. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Modelfor a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1972).
Those classifications which are "suspect" or which otherwise affect fundamen-
tal rights are subjected to an exacting strict scrutiny standard, which requires a
"necessary" relationship between the classification and a "compelling" state in-
terest. Id. Other classifications are held to a minimum rationality test, which
is satisfied by the mere showing of a "rational" relationship to a "permissible"
1118 [Vol. 66:1115
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discrimination and must prove the importance of its asserted
objective and a substantial relationship between the classifica-
tion and that objective.14 If the government is unable to show
that its asserted objective cannot be effectively achieved by a
gender-neutral classification its ability to satisfy this burden
may be substantially diminished.15 In the present context, the
separate sex athletic team system is commonly alleged to be
substantially related to governmental interests in the preven-
tion of bodily harm due to physiological differences between
males and females,16 the prevention of psychological harm to
governmental objective. Id. See also Comment, The Constitutionality of Statu-
tory Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.. L. REv. 757, 779 (1980).
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court departed from its estab-
lished two-tier analysis and introduced an intermediate level of scrutiny for the
review of gender-based classifications. Under the standard established in
Craig, a gender-based classification "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives." Id. at 197 (interpreting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). See also
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). This intermediate level
of scrutiny has been adopted by courts dealing with sex-based classifications in
interscholastic athletics. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 581-
82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholas-
tic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D. Wis. 1978). But see Hoover v.
Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 168-71 (D. Colo. 1977) (balancing the importance of
the opportunity being denied or burdened, the strength of the state interest
served by its denial, and the character of the group whose opportunities are
denied).
14. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 490 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1980); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
15. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 490 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 348 (1st
Cir. 1975); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir.
1973); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
Traditionally, one factor which courts consider in determining whether the
sex-based classification underlying a separate sex team system is properly re-
lated to a valid state purpose is the contact or non-contact nature of the partic-
ular sport. It is argued that because of physical differences between the sexes,
females would suffer serious physical injury if they participate in coeducational
sports involving bodily contact. Separate sex contact sports teams are there-
fore found sufficiently related to the avowed governmental objective of harm
prevention. See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp.
1212, 1216 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affid, 516 F.2d 1328 (3rd Cir. 1975); Comment, Sex Dis-
crimination in Interscholastic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 535,
550 (1974). For a discussion of the demise of the distinction between contact
and non-contact sports, see Commentary, Sex Discrimination in Athletics: Con-
flicting Legislative and Judicial Approaches, 29 A.lA. L. REV. 390, 395 (1978).
For a definition of "contact sports" utilized in Title IX analysis, see infra note
79.
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athletes in a coeducational system,'7 the prevention of poten-
tial harm posed to female athletic programs by a coeducational
system,18 and the promotion of maximum athletic participation
by both genders.19 Although each of the commonly advanced
governmental interests can be said to be sufficiently impor-
tant,20 the substantiality of the relationship between the segre-
gated team system and the achievement of these interests is
less clear.
Courts have increasingly found little merit in the defend-
ant's assertion that the separate sex team system is necessary
to prevent physical harm to female athletes.2 1 Physiological
differences between the sexes change as males and females age
and mature.22 Moreover, there exists a wide range of individ-
ual differences in physiological attributes within either sex at
any given age.23 Therefore, a blanket rule that separate teams
are necessary to protect females because they are more suscep-
tible to bodily injury than males inaccurately reflects true
physical differences between the sexes. In addition, the state
does not extend this protection to weaker and less athletically
17. See, e.g., Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference,
Inc., No. 12-49-27, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Conn. March 29, 1971).
18. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio
High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 1981); Brenden v. In-
dependent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973); Haas v. South
Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 524, 289 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1972).
19. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1980); Yellow
Springs Exempted Village School District Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 1981); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1977). See generally Comment,
supra note 16, at 558.
20. Although the techniques encompassed by intermediate review include
the assessment of the "importance" of the avowed state objective, only one ob-
jective-administrative convenience-has been deemed of insufficient impor-
tance to sustain a gender-based classification. See L. TamE, supra note 12, § 16-
30, at 1082-83. In addition, each of the commonly advanced governmental objec-
tives has been found to be sufficiently important to support a gender-based
classification in the context of interscholastic athletics. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981)
(maximization of participation); Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364
F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affid, 516 F.2d 1328 (3rd Cir. 1975) (preven-
tion of harm); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930, 932 (W.D. Pa.
1973) (fostering of female programs); Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic
Athletic Conference, Inc., No. 12-49-27, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Conn. March 29,
1971) (prevention of psychological harm).
21. See, e.g., Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 349-50 (1st
Cir. 1975); Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir.
1973); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
22. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 349-51 (1st Cir.
1975).
23. See Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
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skillful males, a further reflection of the irrationality of this jus-
tification for the separate sex team system. The governmental
interest in preventing physical harm could be served by a less
arbitrary gender-neutral classification which segregates ath-
letes on the basis of individual size, strength, and athletic skill.
The wide range of physical differences within and between the
sexes at a given age seriously undermines the credibility of the
relationship between the gender classification and the asserted
governmental interest. Because the government will be unable
to show that its asserted objective cannot be achieved by a gen-
der-neutral classification, 24 the separate sex team system is not
substantially related to the prevention of bodily harm to female
athletes.25
Some courts26 and commentators 27 have asserted that
schools need a separate sex team system to prevent the psy-
chological harm resulting from a coeducational athletic pro-
gram in which females are unable to successfully compete with
males and males are unable to fulfill their athletic potential.
This assertion is undermined, however, by two basic flaws.
First, proponents of this assertion offer no evidence to support
the premise that an athlete who always or never wins will suf-
fer psychological harm.28 In the absence of such evidence, it is
unreasonable to assume that the coeducational athletic pro-
gram will cause participants to suffer serious psychological
harm.2 9 Second, the assertion is flawed because even if such
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. The dissent in Yellow Springs observed that proponents "will be hard-
pressed ever to prove [the prevention of harm] rationale. Every athlete must
accept the risk of injury. The goal of safety strikes me as another example of
patronizing protection for women.... [S]uch 'romantic paternalism' has the
'practical effect' of putting women 'not on a pedestal, but in a cage."' Yellow
Springs Exempted Village Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 647
F.2d 651, 664 n.5 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
26. See, e.g., Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference,
Inc., No. 12-49-27, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Conn. March 29, 1971) ("In the world
of sports, there is ever present as a challenge, the psychology to win. With
boys vying with girls . . . the challenge to win, the glory of achievement, at
least for many boys, would lose incentive and become nullified.").-
27. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 352-53.
28. See Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc.,
No. 12-49-27, slip. op. at 8-9 (Super. Ct. Conn. March 29, 1971).
29. The possibility that a coeducational system would cause psychological
harm to athletic participants has not prevented HEW, New York, or Michigan
from promulgating regulations which allow coeducational competition in non-
contact sports. See infra notes 78, 101 and accompanying text. Several other
states have construed applicable state provisions to allow coeducational partici-
pation whether or not the sport at issue is a contact sport. See infra note 101
and accompanying text. Such legislative action suggests that there may exist a
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serious psychological harm actually would occur, the type of
athletic team structure would not prevent it. Every competitive
athletic system is comprised of relatively greater and lesser
skilled individuals.30 Thus, if it is true that athletes who either
always or never compete successfully suffer psychological
harm, the harm will occur regardless of whether the individual
competes in a separate sex or coeducational team system.31
For this reason, even if psychological harm is a realistic con-
cern, its prevention is not substantially related to maintaining a
separate sex team system.
Another alleged governmental objective underlying the
separate sex team system is the prevention of the adverse ef-
fect on the future development of female athletic programs. 32
Supporters of the separate sex team system argue that the de-
velopment of the level of competition in new female athletic
programs will be seriously undermined if the most able female
competitors are lost to established male athletic programs.33
lack of firm data supporting the proponent's argument that institution of a co-
educational team system will result in psychological harm to athletes. For a
discussion of a New York study designed to examine the effects of a coeduca-
tional system on athletic participants which adds some support to this theory,
see Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1301-02 (8th Cir.
1973); Note, supra note 5, at 353.
.30. The proponents of the psychological harm theory appear to envision an
athletic system which provides one or more male-dominated athletic teams,
thus frequently forcing the female athlete to face her inability to successfully
compete with her peers and causing her to suffer psychological harm. This re-
sult appears unrealistic, however, in view of the requirement under Title IX
that both female and male athletes be given an equal opportunity to participate
in athletics. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Thus, the female
athlete will be afforded the choice of participating within the female or male
athletic program, assuring, to some degree, that she will be mentally prepared
for the psychological effects of her choice.
31. For instance, it could just as easily be maintained that the separate sex
team system is undesirable because the athletically inferior male may suffer
psychological harm from being unable to successfully compete with more
skilled male peers, while the exceptional female athlete competing with athleti-
cally inferior female peers may suffer psychological harm when unable to com-
pete at her optimal skill level.
32. In the past decade, both the number of female athletic participants and
the number of female teams increased. See MoRE HURDLES, supra note 1, at 11-
12. Some courts have determined that women's athletic programs will be sig-
nificantly harmed if the best female athletes are permitted to compete in a
predominantly male athletic program. See authorities cited supra note 18.
These courts reason that not only will the female teams lose their most able
competitors, but female athletic programs generally will lose an impetus for fu-
ture program development.
33. Alternatively, it has been argued that a separate sex athletic team sys-
tem is necessary to protect the future development of female athletic programs
because a mandatory coeducational team system would result in male-domi-
nated teams. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 524,
1122 [Vol. 66:1115
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Courts weighing this argument have found it too speculative to
have merit.34 Coeducational programs which attract the best
female athletes may just as easily have a positive effect on fe-
male athletic programs by "calling attention to the abilities of
female athletes and consequently raising fan interest and fund-
ing.,3 5 In addition to its overly speculative nature, the argu-
ment is unpersuasive because it proposes that the exceptional
female athlete be required to participate at less than her opti-
mal skill level solely because, if she does not do so, other fe-
male athletes may be forced to play at lower levels of
competition. That requirement is repugnant to the fundamen-
tal ideal of equal athletic opportunity.3 6
289 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1972). As Justice Stevens stated, however, in O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980):
In some respects, Karen's claim is no different from that of any other
sixth or seventh grader. The younger children are permitted to tryout
for the eighth-grade teams, but the eighth graders are excluded from
the seventh-grade teams because their participation would be unfair to
the younger students. The fact that an eighth-grader must face compe-
tition from talented seventh-graders without reciprocal rights indicates
that there is no necessary reason why boys may not be required to
compete with talented girls without reciprocal rights.
Id. at 1306 n.4. See also Petrie v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass'n, 75 Ill. App.
3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. School Bd., 74 A.D.2d
248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980), appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d 760 (1982).
34. See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Brenden v. Independent School Dist.,
742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973). The court in Yellow Springs did not make
any ruling on the merits of the defendant's harm to female athletic programs,
because it determined that the district court could have decided the case with-
out reaching the constitutional issue. See infra note 53.
35. Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio
High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Courts must look to the overall athletic experience provided an individ-
ual under a particular athletic system and pay closer attention to the objectives
underlying interscholastic athletics to best define equality of opportunity for
high school athletes. If the major objective of participation in interscholastic
athletics is to increase athletic skills, a system which allows the athlete to com-
pete at his or her optimal skill level will best achieve this goal. If the major
objective is to teach athletes how to compete and cooperate well within a team
structure, it becomes less clear which system will best effectuate this purpose.
The close bonds and friendship which result from participating on a single sex
team, especially during those years when the commingling of the sexes may
feel unnatural to many, suggests that a system of single sex teams may pro-
duce a more conducive atmosphere for the development of the individual ath-
lete's skills in cooperation and leadership. On the other hand, courts must
recognize the increased potential for males and females to interact with each
other in today's work environment. If an objective of interscholastic athletics is
to foster the individual athlete's "strength of character, leadership qualities and
to provide competitive situations through which [she or] he will better learn to
cope with the demands of the future," Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396, 1400
11231982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Finally, proponents of the separate sex team system have
argued that if courts forbid sex-based classifications in inter-
scholastic athletics, males will dominate the athletic programs
offered, and thus deny to most female athletes a meaningful op-
portunity to participate.3 7 The relationship between the sepa-
rate team system and the asserted governmental interest in
maximizing athletic participation can be discredited on two
grounds. First, the fear that allowing females to try out for
male athletic teams will necessarily lead to a decrease in fe-
male athletic participation is entirely unsupported by evi-
dence.3 8 This rationale assumes without qualification that
females as a class are athletically inferior to males. Although it
may be true that some females are unable to compete in sports
on an equal basis with their male peers, it is arbitrary to as-
sume that all females are unable to effectively compete with
males.3 9 Second, proponents have argued that a coeducational
(N.D. Ohio 1974), it must be recognized that the separate sex team system is
not the most effective means to achieve these objectives.
37. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301, 1307 (1980); Cape v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill.
1972); cf. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir.
1973) (males are physiologically stronger); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361
F. Supp. 930, 932 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (same). The Cape court stated, " [I]t takes
little imagination to realize that were play -and competition not separated by
sex, the great bulk of the females would quickly be eliminated from participa-
tion and denied any meaningful opportunity for athletic involvement." 563 F.2d
at 795. See generally Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Ohio High School Athletics Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 1981);
Comment, supra note 16, at 558-59.
38. Since there has never been a mandatory requirement that schools es-
tablish a system of coeducational interscholastic athletic teams, no firm evi-
dence based on actual experience exists regarding the effect of coeducational
teams on maximizing participation in sports. Litigants could just as easily sug-
gest that increased competition and skill will more strongly motivate female
athletes to participate in interscholastic athletics. Furthermore, the possibility
of disrupting female participation has not prevented Congress and numerous
states from allowing coeducational athletic competition. See supra note 29. Lit-
igants might also assert that because large discrepancies exist in the availabil-
ity of teams in certain sports, such as football, for males and females, a
coeducational team system would substantially maximize the female athlete's
opportunity to compete in interscholastic athletics. See supra notes 4-5 and ac-
companying text.
39. Recent studies reveal that an undetermined percentage of physical ine-
quality between men and women results from the social or cultural restrictions
imposed on the female. See Wilmore, Exploding the Myth of Female Inferi-
ority, PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, May 1974, at 54, 55. Wilmore argues that
the young female athlete is caught in a vicious cycle. While she is denied the
opportunity to increase her strength, skill, and physical well-being because of
alleged physical differences between males and females, her male peers are, at
the same time, encouraged to participate in the male athletic program. This
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system would result in a restriction of opportunities for pro-
spective female athletes, erroneously assuming that schools
would abandon female programs in favor of one or more male-
dominated coeducational athletic teams. Title IX, however,
mandates that each school provide equal athletic opportunity
to both female and male students.40 This mandate would not
be followed if female athletes are not capable of participating
on the only coeducational athletic team provided by a school.41
In such circumstances, Title IX directs that schools provide ad-
ditional opportunities for female athletes.42 Accordingly, the
abandonment of the separate sex team system would not result
in a restriction of athletic opportunities for females. Therefore,
the system is not substantially related to the important govern-
mental interest in the maximization of athletic participation.43
Proponents have not yet demonstrated that separate sex
teams are substantially related to an important governmental
objective.44 Even if assumed to be of sufficient importance, the
avowed government interests may be served by less intrusive
gender-neutral classifications, thus rendering the gender-based
team system virtually unjustifiable.45 Thus, separate sex teams
process, itself, increases the differences in the physical capabilities and athletic
abilities of males and females. Id. at 54.
40. See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio
High School Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
Several states have also enacted constitutional provisions or legislation requir-
ing equal athletic opportunity for both genders. See infra notes 92-111 and ac-
companying text. Thus, even if a particular plaintiff is unable to invoke the
protections of Title IX, see infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text, an applica-
ble state provision may mandate that equal opportunity to participate be ex-
tended to both genders.
41. See infra note 80.
42. Id. See supra note 30.
43. Although the Seventh Circuit reached a contrary result in O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981), the
court failed to consider properly whether the defendant's separate sex athletic
program, which appeared to comply with HEW regulations, nonetheless vio-
lated Title IX or an applicable state provision requiring equal athletic opportu-
nity for both females and males. Id. Thus, the court did not properly consider
the mandate of Title IX, or potentially existing state law, in its determination
that the separate sex team system provided the plaintiff with the requisite
equality of athletic opportunity.
44. The weakness of the purported relationship has become even clearer
with the enactment of Title IX and state legislation, and the requirements they
place on the structure of interscholastic sports teams. See supra note 36; infra
notes 57-111 and accompanying text. The precedential effect of equal protection
cases decided prior to the implementation of Title IX, as well as recent promul-
gations of applicable state laws, must be reinterpreted in the present context.
45. See authorities cited supra note 15.
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appear to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
2. Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The female athlete may also challenge a separate sex inter-
scholastic athletic team under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.1 6 The due process clause prohibits the
state from depriving an individual of an interest in liberty or
property unless the state shows that an avowed government in-
terest is sufficient to justify the deprivation.47 Thus, to proceed
under the due process clause, the individual claimant must al-
lege a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest.
The claim that a separate team system is unconstitutional
under the due process clause was upheld in at least one case.
The federal district court in Yellow Springs Exempted Village
School District Board of Education v. Ohio High School Athletic
Association48 found that female students have a liberty inter-
est in freedom of choice in matters concerning their state-sup-
ported education.49 In assessing whether the deprivation of
this liberty interest was justified by the asserted governmental
interests in preventing injuries to female athletes and maximiz-
ing female athletic opportunities, the Yellow Springs court rea-
soned that both avowed interests rested upon a conclusive
presumption that females are less skilled athletes than males
solely because of their gender.5O The Yellow Springs court
found this underlying presumption invalid, because the due
process clause does not permit the state to deny an individual's
protected liberty interest on the basis of a presumption that
might be rebutted on an individual basis.51 Since the Associa-
tion's rule barring physically capable female athletes from par-
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
47. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974).
48. 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 651
(6th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 758. For a general discussion of the Yellow Springs case, see 4 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 197 (1979).
50. 443 F. Supp. at 758.
51. Id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)). The
Supreme Court held in LaFleur that an irrebuttable presumption, embodied in
certain school board regulations, concerning a pregnant woman's inability to
teach 'Is neither 'necessarily [nor] universally true' and is violative of the Due
Process Clause." 414 U.S. at 646 (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452
(1973)). The Yellow Springs court stated, "[A]lthough some women are physi-
cally unfit to participate with boys in contact sports, it does not 'necessarily and
universally' follow that all women suffer similar disabilities." 443 F. Supp. at
758.
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ticipating with males in interscholastic sports was based on an
irrebuttable presumption, the Yellow Springs court held that
the rule deprived them of liberty without due process of law.52
Subsequent judicial decisions, however, have raised strong
doubts as to the viability of a due process argument for the fe-
male athlete wishing to compete for a position on an all-male
athletic team. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, re-
versing the district court's decision in Yellow Springs on the
grounds that the "irrebuttable presumption doctrine" was not
an issue properly before the court,5 3 asserted that the court
should review most cases of alleged sex discrimination under
the equal protection standard rather than under the due pro-
cess clause.54 Moreover, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
has engendered frequent criticism,55 and the Supreme Court
has exhibited an increased reluctance to refer to the doctrine. 56
The plaintiff may therefore find future courts unreceptive to
the argument that an athletic system of separate sex teams de-
nies the female athlete due process under the fourteenth
amendment.
52. Id.
53. 647 F.2d at 658. The court found it inappropriate to make any ruling on
the merits of the due process argument since the lower court could have
decided Yellow Springs without reaching the constitutional question by finding
that the athletic association rule at issue was being interpreted and applied too
restrictively to prohibit females from participating on a male team in any con-
tact sport in violation of Title IX regulations. Id. at 656. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1686 (1976).
54. 647 F.2d at 657. As stated by the Yellow Springs circuit court, "The
Supreme Court has now clearly held that in most cases of alleged sex discrimi-
nation it is equal protection which provides the standard for judicial scrutiny
* * not due process." Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). The
Seventh Circuit has also expressly declined to follow the reasoning of the Yel-
low Springs district court. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 582
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illu-
sory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
56. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Several appellate courts
have recently begun to treat the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions as coex-
tensive with the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Trafelet v. Thompson, 594
F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d
757, 760 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). These courts suggest
that the objections to an irrebuttable presumption rest in its arbitrary classifi-
cation of individuals. If a court finds, however, that an individual has received
equal protection under a law, that individual cannot be said to have concur-
rently suffered an arbitrary classification under that law. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981).
Thus, the female athlete who has been denied relief under the equal protection
clause may meet with little success in her attempt to invalidate a separate sex
system of athletic teams under the due process clause.
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B. TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
In addition to constitutional challenges, female plaintiffs
may challenge gender-based classifications and program dis-
parities in high school athletics under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.57 Title IX generally prohibits sex discrim-
ination in educational programs receiving federal financial
assistance. 8
The power to enforce Title IX-9 is vested in the Depart-
ment of Education,60 which has the authority to withdraw fed-
eral funding from those institutions with athletic programs that
violate the statute.6 ' In addition, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that an individual may maintain a private cause of action
57. Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
58. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides: "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." Id. § 1681.
The text of Title IX makes no direct mention of the inclusion of athletics.
Sports were mentioned only twice in the congressional debates on the pro-
posed bill. See 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG.
REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Commentators have divided on
the basic issue of whether Congress intended to include athletic programs
within the scope of Title IX. Compare Gaal & DiLorenzo, The Legality and Re-
quirements of HEWs Proposed "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Intercol-
legiate Athletics, 6 J. COLLEGE & UL. 161, 163-66 (1979-80) (based on lack of
specific exemption in the text of Title IX or its legislative history, the express
language of the Javits Amendment, the several congressional attempts to ex-
clude athletics from the scope of Title 1Y, and the failure of Congress to reject
HEW's regulations, it is clear that athletics are not exempt from scope of Title
IX) and Note, Sex- Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some
Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255, 1264-69 (1979) (social policy underly-
ing Title IX mandates that athletics be included within the scope of Title IX)
with Kuhn, Title IX Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEWs Jurisdic-
tion, 65 GEo. L.J. 49, 62-65 (1976) (athletic programs not within the scope of Ti-
tie IX because they are not education programs 'receiving Federal financial
aid"). Although there exists little direct evidence that Congress intended Title
IX to apply to athletic programs, the language of the statute is broadly worded,
encompassing "any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Clearly athletic programs are educa-
tional programs within the general terms of Title IX, and if a sufficient funding
relationship exists between the federal government and the particular athletic
program, see infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text, the requirements of Title
IX must be considered applicable.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
60. All functions of HEW relating to Title IX were transferred to the newly
created Department of Education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 11 1979).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). Title IX further provides that compliance by
the recipient may be effected by any other means authorized by law. Id. HEW
regulations, promulgated pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), provide
the enforcement procedures of the agency from investigation of complaints
through the final termination of federal assistance. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7-80.11
(1980).
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under Title IX.62 In either case, the particular educational in-
stitution's athletic program must have received sufficient fed-
eral assistance to come within the purview of Title IX.63 The
plaintiff's success in this showing will depend on the court's in-
terpretation of the degree to which the challenged athletic pro-
gram must benefit from the institution's receipt of federal
funds. The challenged athletic program must also have pre-
cluded the plaintiff from participating in, or deriving benefits
from, that program solely on the basis of sex.64 The plaintiff's
success in showing preclusion is more problematic and will de-
pend upon both the nature of the plaintiffs claim and the na-
ture of the challenged athletic program. If the plaintiff
successfully demonstrates these two elements, Title IX is avail-
able to remedy the prohibited sex discrimination.
It is unclear what constitutes a sufficient funding relation-
ship between the federal government and the athletic program
at issue to invoke judicial scrutiny under Title IX. The Depart-
ment's most recent policy interpretation extends the coverage
of Title IX to every program of an institution receiving federal
financial aid, regardless of any traceable benefit to the particu-
lar program at issue.6 5 In contrast, a federal district court re-
cently held that Title IX applies only if the challenged athletic
program has received direct federal financial assistance.66
62. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
63. Title IX provides that "[elach Federal department... empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity... is
authorized and directed to effectuate the [Title IX] provisions ... with respect
to such program or activity." 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
64. See supra note 58.
65. The Department's proposed policy interpretation applied Title IX to
any athletic program which is maintained at an institution which receives
federal financial assistance directly or indirectly benefitting the athletic pro-
gram. In addition, it expressly extended Title IX jurisdiction to any athletic
program maintained at an institution which receives federal financial assist-
ance for a defined program, where the discriminatory aspects of the athletic
program are so integrally related to the financially funded program that it "in-
fects" the funded program. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). In December of 1979,
HEW announced its adoption of a final policy interpretation designed to pro-
vide greater guidance to recipient institutions regarding the demands of Title
IX in the area of athletics. HEW's policy interpretation of Title IX coverage ex-
tends "to any public or private institution ... that operates an educational pro-
gram or activity which receives or benefits from [federal] financial assistance."
44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1979) (emphasis added). The "institutional" focus adopted
in HEW's final policy interpretation appears to have expanded Title IX jurisdic-
tion to all athletic programs of any institution receiving benefits from federal
financial assistance regardless of any direct benefit to a particular athletic pro-
gram. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1979).
66. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich.
1981). The Othen court held that direct federal financial aid to a specific educa-
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These opposing interpretations of the scope of Title IX have
great practical significance due to the nature of federal financial
aid to secondary schools.67 A highly restrictive direct assist-
ance interpretation will cripple the impact of Title IX on sex
discrimination in high school athletics. 68 No interscholastic
athletic program receives direct federal aid,69 and institutions
-wishing to avoid Title IX may be able to funnel federal dollars
into programs which are not likely to be challenged as sex dis-
criminatory.70 Such a result cannot be justified when viewed
against the background of the social policies Title IX promotes.
tion program is required before the provisions of Title IX can be applied. Thus,
even though the Ann Arbor school board received federal impact aid which was
put into the general fund and which may have indirectly benefited the chal-
lenged athletic program, the athletic program was not within the scope of Title
IX. Id.
67. The only federal program of noncategorical assistance to local educa-
tional agencies is the federal impact program, under which the federal govern-
ment provides financial aid to school districts financially burdened by federal
activities within the district. 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-241 (1976). This type of federal aid
goes directly to school districts' general funds and is thus distributed to all the
districts' educational programs. Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REV.
103, 112 n.60 (1974). Other federal programs providing funds to local educa-
tional agencies are categorical in nature, thus requiring states to use funds to
supplement and not supplant local funds. Kuhn, supra note 58, at 71. Allowing
such categorical funds to free local funds for an interscholastic athletic pro-
gram would violate federal law. See, e.g., Vocational Education Act of 1963, 20
U.S.C. § 2306(a) (6) (1976); Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1413(a)(9) (1976).
68. Under the direct assistance interpretation, the institution receiving
noncategorical federal impact aid may avoid liability under Title IX simply by
funneling federal dollars into its nondiscriminatory education programs, thus
freeing non-federal funds to support a sex discriininatory athletic program. See,
e.g., Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
On the other hand, the institutional assistance interpretation would extend
coverage to any institution receiving federal funds, barring calculated disburse-
ment of federal funds in a manner enabling the recipient to support discrimina-
tory activity with federal funds. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414 (1979). The Department
has, arguably, extended Title IX coverage to those institutions receiving purely
supplementary federal assistance from a federal categorical aid program even
if the funds do not benefit the alleged sex discriminatory athletic program. See
Gaal, Di Lorenzo & Evans, HEWs Final "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 6 J. COLLEGE & U.L. 345, 352 (1979-80). At least one
court has held, however, that this interpretation of the scope of Title IX is over-
broad. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (E.D. Mich.
1981). Numerous commentators adopt a more moderate jurisdictional approach
than either the Department or the Othen court. Under this view, the athletic
program at issue must have received a specific benefit, direct or indirect, from
federal financial assistance to fall within the scope of Title IX. See, e.g., Cox,
Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 34, 37-39 (1977);
Gaal, DiLorenzo & Evans, supra, at 351; Comment, supra note 67, at 112.
69. See supra note 67.
70. Funneling of federal dollars can occur only if the school district is re-
ceiving noncategorical federal impact aid. See supra notes 67-68.
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Seeking to eliminate sex discrimination in education,1 Con-
gress designed Title IX both to prevent the injustices of sex
stereotyping resulting from a segregation of the sexes in group
activities,72 and to provide equal access to educational opportu-
nities so that all individuals can develop their full potential.73
Because of the subtle yet pervasive influence of athletics on
cultural norms and social stereotypes,74 the important social
policies underlying the enactment of Title IX require the courts
to apply the statute broadly to athletic programs.
Once it is determined that Title IX applies to the athletic
program at issue, the female athlete must demonstrate that the
program does not comply with the requirements of the statute.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare promul-
gated regulations in 1975 to delineate the criteria that an af-
fected institution's athletic programs must meet to comply with
Title IX. Although the regulations generally forbid schools
from providing separate sex teams in the same sport,7 5 excep-
tions are recognized "where selection for such teams is based
upon competitive skill or the activity is a contact sport."76 By
permitting schools to maintain separate sex teams in the same
sport if the selection of team members is based on competitive
skill, the scope of the statute is severely restricted.77 If a school
provides a team in a particular non-contact sport for members
of one sex only, however, the regulations provide that the
school must permit members of the excluded sex to compete
for a position on that team if the school has previously limited
athletic opportunities for the excluded sex.78 Under the contact
sports exception, schools may deny the female athlete an op-
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
72. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (strong measure needed
to end persistent discrimination that perpetuates second-class citizenship for
American women).
73. Id. at 5808 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (Title IX affords American women
what is rightfully theirs-an equal chance to develop their potential in the edu-
cational setting).
74. See Note, supra note 58, at 1266-67.
75. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1981).
76. Id. § 86.41(b).
77. Virtually all interscholastic teams have member selection based on
skill and thus are arguably outside the reach of section 86.41(a). See id. See
also infra note 80 and accompanying text. Thus, major high school sports, such
as football, basketball, and baseball are exempt from section 86.41(a)'s general
prohibition of separate sex teams.
78. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1981). The regulation provides:
Where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for mem-
bers of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that
sex have been previously limited, members of the excluded sex must
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portunity to compete for a position on a contact sports team
even if no female team in that sport is provided.7 9
The overall effect of these regulations on the structure of
team sports is unclear, though, because even in instances in
which the exceptions operate, a requirement of greater oppor-
tunity for female athletes may be implied from the general
equal opportunity provision. The general equal opportunity
provision, found in the Department's regulations, provides that
a recipient educational institution's athletic program must pro-
vide equal athletic opportunity and effectively accommodate
the interests and abilities of both female and male athletes.8 0
The regulations require recipient institutions to accommodate
the interests and abilities of female and male athletes effec-
tively by providing an appropriate selection of sports and ad-
vanced levels of competition.81
Hence, even if the recipient educational institution com-
ports with Title IX by offering "tangibly" equivalent separate
sex athletic teams, 82 the exceptional female athlete can invoke
be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a
contact sport.
Id.
79. Id. The regulations define the term "contact sports" to include "boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose
of [sic] major activity of which involves bodily contact." Id.
80. Id. § 86.41(c).
81. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417-18 (1979). The Department recently published its
final policy interpretation, intended to provide greater guidance for institutions
wishing to comply with the requirements of Title IX. For a general definition of
what the agency considers to constitute "equal athletic opportunity" and "effec-
tive accommodation of student interests and abilities," see id. at 71,415-18.
Although the Department frames its general compliance standard under
section 86.41(c) in terms of equivalent benefits and opportunities on a "pro-
gram-wide" basis rather than by a "sport-specific" comparison, id. at 71,421-22
(1979), the final policy interpretation provides that noncompliance may be
found under Title IX if "disparities in benefits, treatment, services, or opportu-
nities in individual segments of the [athletic] program are substantial enough
in and of themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity." Id. at 71,417.
Thus, the female athlete should be awarded relief under Title IX upon a show-
ing that a recipient is operating demonstrably unequal separate sex teams in a
particular sport. The right of the individual athlete to participate in a nondis-
criminatory federally financed athletic program can be achieved only if female
and male athletes are afforded equivalent treatment, benefits, and opportuni-
ties in similar sports or circumstances.
82. Title IX may be invoked by a female athlete competing on a separate
female team to challenge the level of benefits the recipient educational institu-
tion provides her team. The equality of opportunity Title IX mandates will not
be attained until female and male athletes receive equivalent "tangible" bene-
fits, including athletic equipment, supplies, and facilities. The regulations rec-
ognize this, and provide a list of factors to be considered in assessing program
disparities in the provision of tangible benefits. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (1980);
see also 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-17 (1979). The regulations, however, only require
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the general equal opportunity provision in an effort to secure
the opportunity to compete for a position on the male team.
The differing levels of competition offered by male and female
athletic teams often afford inherently unequal athletic opportu-
nity for the exceptional female athlete able to compete with her
male peers. Although the exceptional female athlete may be
afforded an equal opportunity to participate in an increased
number of female sports offerings,8 3 the regulation requiring a
school to provide separate female teams upon a showing of ad-
equate female interest 84 may not effectively accommodate her
interests and abilities. If restricted to competing only on a
fledgling female team, the exceptional female athlete will not
be afforded a qualitatively equal opportunity to maximize ath-
letic skills and realize athletic potential.8 5 If a Title IX recipi-
ent requires an exceptional female athlete to participate in a
female athletic program offering a demonstrably lower level of
competition, federal financial funds will have perpetuated the
the Department to consider these factors when evaluating the entire athletic
program, permitting equality in one aspect of an athletic program to compen-
sate for inequality in another. See id. at 71,415, 71,422 (comment 8). If compari-
sons indicate a disparate provision of financial aid or program components, the
Department may still find compliance if the differences are a result of nondis-
criminatory factors. Id. This approach reflects the fact that disparities in the
proportion of benefits provided male and female teams in a particular sport
may be due to legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors inherent in the operation
of other sports. Id. at 71,415-16. Yet, it is clear that such disparities may also
result from prohibited discriminatory factors. In these circumstances, however,
the female plaintiff would be denied relief absent a showing of program-wide
inequality. The program-wide approach may therefore serve to encourage the
,different treatment of individuals solely on the basis of sex, the very evil Title
IX was adopted to remedy. Accordingly, an alternative approach which focuses
on the reasons for the disparate treatment of separate sex teams in a particular
sport, rather than on program-wide totals, should be developed to further more
effectively the purposes of Title IX.
83. In an effort to comply with Title IX, recipient educational institutions
have greatly increased the number of athletic opportunities provided the fe-
male athlete. See MoRE HuRDLEs, supra note 1, at 12.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (1980), interpreted at 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
This requirement may be satisfied by affording proportionately equal numbers
of male and female athletes equivalently advanced competitive opportunities.
Id. Thus, the HEW regulations do not appear to require that the exceptional
female athlete be given the opportunity to try out for a male athletic team if
she is competing at a level consistent with other exceptional female athletes
within the athletic program.
85. It has been asserted that the group equalization mandated by Title IX
and the regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,421 (1979), "requires equal opportunity for
the most qualified athletes of either sex to participate at the most competitive
leveL" Note, supra note 58, at 1274. Even if the school offers a female team,
allowing the exceptional female athlete to compete for a more highly skilled
male team is a reasonable remedy to promote group equalization in light of his-
torically limited athletic opportunities for females. Id.
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current disparity in athletic skills between genders.86 This re-
sult is unacceptable under a statute designed to remedy sex
discrimination in federally-aided educational programs.
The female athlete may also invoke the general equal op-
portunity provision of Title IX to challenge a recipient institu-
tion's athletic program and to gain an opportunity to compete
for a position on a male contact sports team when the school
provides no female team in the particular sport.87 The excep-
tion in section 86.41(b) of the Department's regulations permit-
ting a Title IX recipient to deny a female athlete the
opportunity to compete for a position on a male contact sports
team is irrational and inconsistent with the social policies un-
derlying the enactment of Title IX. The Department appar-
ently designed the contact sports exception to prevent physical
injury to female athletes. Although the prevention of athletic
injury is certainly desirable, it rests on the unsupported as-
sumption that females capable of successfully competing with
males in a contact sport are, as a class, more susceptible to in-
jury. Moreover, a rule which bars female athletes from compet-
ing against males in contact sports while providing no similar
bar for the demonstrably weak male athlete is clearly arbi-
trary.88 In addition to its irrational character, the exception for
contact sports is inconsistent with the purposes of Title IX be-
cause it perpetuates the stereotypical view of the female as
weak, fragile, and unable to compete with males in sports re-
quiring physical contact.8 9 Congress intended to reduce this
type of sex-stereotyping with the enactment of Title IX.90
The effect of Title IX, and HEW regulations promulgated
thereunder, on sex discrimination in federally aided interscho-
lastic athletics remains unclear.9 1 As an initial matter, it is un-
clear how directly a challenged athletic program must benefit
from the educational institution's receipt of federal funds to
trigger the prohibitions of the statute. Secondly, it is unclear
whether equality of opportunity is to be determined by consid-
ering the relative opportunities in an entire athletic program or
whether a more restricted inquiry is appropriate. This Note
86. See supra note 39.
87. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1981). Although the HEW interpretation requires
a recipient school to sponsor a separate female contact sports team if adequate
interest is shown, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979), when the interest is inadequate in-
terested females do not have a right to try out for the male teams. Id.
88. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 2.
90. See Note, supra note 58, at 1266.
91. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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suggests that courts resolve these uncertainties in light of the
social policies that prompted the enactment of Title IX, permit-
ting the female athlete to invoke the statute to challenge sex
discriminatory practices in interscholastic athletic programs.
C. STATE CONSITrUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Although efforts to amend the United States Constitution
by adding the proposed equal rights amendment have been un-
successful,9 2 fourteen states have adopted their own equal
rights amendments. 93 The female athlete residing in one of
these states may thus bring suit to establish the right to com-
pete for a position on an all-male athletic team under her
state's constitutional provision. In addition, state civil rights
legislation, or state statutes specifically prohibiting sex discrim-
ination, may be invoked in a number of jurisdictions to chal-
lenge the separate sex team system.
State constitutional equal rights provisions which prohibit
the government from making classifications on the basis of sex
can provide a strong basis of support for the female athlete
challenging an interscholastic gender separate athletic team
system.94 Those state equal rights amendments which have
been adopted, however, have not been uniformly interpreted.
Some states have read their constitutional provisions to pro-
vide no greater protection than that available under the Federal
Constitution.9 5 A number of state courts, however, recognizing
92. The proposed federal provision states: "Equality of rights shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex."
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 9568 (1972).
93. Eight of these states have adopted provisions very similar to the pro-
posed federal equal rights amendment. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; MD. DECLA-
RATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46; MASS. CONST. part I, art. I; N.L CONST. part 1, art. 21;
N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; WASH.
CONST. art. 31, § 1. The remaining six states have adopted provisions which
vary in text from the proposed federal provision. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 20; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 18; MONT. CONST.
art. 11, § 4; VA. CONST. art. I, § 1. Utah and Wyoming included provisions prohib-
iting discrimination on the basis of sex in their original state constitutions.
UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 2.
94. . To maintain such a suit, the plaintiff must initially show that the de-
fendant's action constitutes a degree of state involvement sufficient to permit
application of the state equal rights amendment Lincoln v. Mid-Cities Football
Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Tex. 1979). The Lincoln court held that the plain-
tiff must show that the alleged discrimination is "state action or private con-
duct that is encouraged by, enabled by, or closely interrelated in function with
state action." Id. at 925. See also Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 422 A.2d
1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 1980); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 24 Wash. App.
161, 165-66, 600 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1979).
95. See, e.g., Peddy v. Montgomery, 345 So.2d 631, 633 (Ala. 1977) (rights
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that a state constitutional provision may be interpreted to af-
ford greater protection of individual rights than the Federal
Constitution,96 have construed equal rights provisions more ex-
pansively than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.97 Female athletes have successfully challenged
the separate sex athletic team system under such state provi-
sions.98 Therefore, a viable ground of relief exists for the plain-
tiff residing in those states which have enacted and broadly
construed a constitutional equal rights provision.
Statutes specifically prohibiting sex discrimination in the
context of interscholastic athletics have been enacted in a
number of states.99 These statutes vary in their terms. Some
protected by state constitution are same as those protected by Federal Consti-
tution); State v. Barton, 315 So.2d 289, 291 (La. 1975) (sex-based classification
permissible if reasonable); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 636, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711
(1973) (sex-based classification must bear a rational relationship to state
objective).
96. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)
(state may guarantee more expansive constitutional rights than those con-
ferred by the Federal Constitution).
97. Some states have interpreted their constitutions to bar sex-based clas-
sifications. See Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 516, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa.
Commw. 45, 53, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (1975); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877,
540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975). Others have applied a type of strict scrutiny. See Pe-
trie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 991, 394 N.E.2d 855, 863
(1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic League, 393
N.E.2d 284, 291 (Mass. 1979); Mercer v. Board of Trustees, 538 S.W.2d 201, 206
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); ef. Holdman v. Olim, 59 Hawaii 346, 354-55, 581 P.2d 1164,
1168-70 (1978) (sex-based classification satisfies compelling state interest test).
98. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 877-78, 540 P.2d 882, 893
(1975); Commonwealth ex reL. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 53, 334 A.2d 839, 842 (1975). A court applying strict
scrutiny to a regulation preventing a qualified female athlete from competing
on a male athletic team solely on the basis of gender would likely find a viola-
tion of the state's equal rights amendment.
99. The Minnesota legislature, for example, recently enacted a statute pro-
viding that "members of a sex whose overall athletic opportunities have previ-
ously been limited ... shall be permitted to try out" for any team in any sport.
MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (4) (1980). Consequently, a Minnesota school district
providing a mandatory system of separate sex athletic teams will be held in vi-
olation of state law if a female athlete challenging the system demonstrates
that her gender has had limited athletic opportunity in the past. See also Mor-
ris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1973) (injunction
against the Michigan high school athletic association which prevented female
athletes from participating in interscholastic non-contact athletics solely be-
cause of their sex; court notes Mlc,. Comp. LAws ANN. § 340.379(2) (1972), al-
lowing females to participate on male non-contact athletic teams).
The "overall limited athletic opportunity" clause in MINN. STAT.
§ 126.21(3) (4) (1980) has not been interpreted by the courts. Courts have split
on their interpretation of the similar "limited opportunity" clause contained in
the regulations promulgated under Title IX to the Education Amendments of
1972. Compare Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659,
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states appear to have adopted legislation which closely corre-
sponds to the provisions of Title IX.100 Other state provisions
provide greater protection against gender-based classification
in interscholastic sports than does the federal statute. 0 1 The
effect of the application of such statutes to a separate sex inter-
scholastic athletic team system depends largely upon an inter-
pretation of the statutory terms.102 The enactment of such
665 (D.R.I.), vacated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) with Mularadelis v. Haldane
Cent. School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 253-54, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (1980), appeal dis-
missed, 54 N.Y.2d 760 (1982) and Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 ll. App.
3d 980, 986-92, 394 N.E.2d 855, 860-64 (1979). Nonetheless, if other states follow
Minnesota in adopting such legislation in this area, the female athlete in the
future may have several state statutes upon which to firmly assert her right to
participate on male athletic teams.
100. See, e.g., CAT_ EDUC. CODE § 41 (West 1978) (publicly-funded athletic
program must provide equal athletic opportunity for both sexes although no re-
quirement for coeducational teams); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 296-60, -61 (1976)
(same language as Title IX); S.D. CODIEMD LAws ANN. § 20-13-22 (Supp. 1981)
(separate sex team system is not discriminatory if opportunity to participate in
athletic program is substantially equal for both sexes); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 118.135 (West Supp. 1981) (no person may be denied on basis of sex opportu-
nity to participate in athletics, as provided in Title IX).
101. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14-18-040 (Supp. 1981) (separate sex teams in
a particular sport allowed only if no disparate distribution of tangible benefits);
MINN. STAT. § 126.21(3) (4) (1980) (if separate sex teams are provided, one team
may be restricted to members of sex whose overall athletic opportunities have
previously been limited, and members of either sex shall be permitted to try
out for the other team); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.85.020(3) (West Supp.
1981) (separate sex teams allowed if no disparate distribution of tangibles).
Several states determine the requisite. equality of opportunity based on
whether the sport at issue is a contact or non-contact sport. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:276 (West Supp. 1982) (public schools shall offer sexually segre-
gated contact sports and sexually integrated non-contact sports); MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 380.1289(3) (Supp. 1981) (female may compete for position on any
offered non-contact team even if provided with girls' team in the particular
sport); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 135.4(c) (7) (ii) (c) (1979) (if school provides
separate sex teams in sports other than basketball, boxing, football, ice hockey,
rugby, and wrestling, chief executive officer may permit females to participate
on male team although males may not participate on female teams). Other
states have adopted statutes appearing less restrictive than Title IX. See, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-3 (1972) (Board of Trustees has discretion to separate
students on basis of sex if it will promote or preserve the public peace or
morals of the students).
102. For example, the recently enacted Minnesota statute provides that
"[ijf two teams are provided in the same sport, one of these teams may be re-
stricted to members of a sex whose overall athletic opportunities have previ-
ously been limited, and members of either sex shall be permitted to try out for
the other team." MiNN. STAT. § 126.21(3), (4) (1980). The courts' interpretation
of the limited opportunity clause will ultimately determine the utility of this
provision for the female athlete. If the plaintiff must demonstrate previous lim-
ited athletic opportunity to participate in the particular sport at issue, see, e.g.,
Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.L), va-
cated, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979), it may be a difficult burden of proof if the
school district offers an equivalent separate female team. If the courts, how-
ever, interpret the statutory language to mean "overall athletic opportunity" as
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specific provisions clearly evidences legislative intent to rem-
edy existing inequities and to provide an equal opportunity for
members of both genders to participate in interscholastic ath-
letics. 03 Such legislation should be interpreted broadly to pro-
hibit schools from maintaining gender classifications in their
athletic programs which deny equal access to educational op-
portunities, thus providing relief for the female athlete barred
from participating in, or deriving benefit from, an athletic pro-
gram solely on the basis of sex.
Those states which have adopted neither an equal rights
amendment nor specific legislation prohibiting gender-based
classifications in interscholastic athletics may nonetheless pro-
vide relief for the plaintiff challenging sex discriminatory ath-
letic programs under general sex discrimination or civil rights
legislation. Several states have enacted legislation prohibiting
sex discrimination in educational programs. 0 4 Other states,
under general civil rights legislation, prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sex in places of public accommodation.105 Because
sex discrimination in interscholastic athletics has been held to
constitute discrimination in education, 0 6 and because inter-
scholastic athletic programs are often conducted in places of
public accommodation, 07 such general state legislation may be
construed to apply to alleged sex discrimination in interscho-
lastic athletics. The apparent underlying objective of general
state sex discrimination or civil rights legislation in this context
is to promote sexual equality by providing equal access to edu-
cational opportunities and by preventing the promotion of delu-
the words imply, see, e.g., Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Il. App. 3d 980,
992, 394 N.E.2d 855, 864 (1979), the plaintiff may be afforded relief, whether or
not a separate female team exists, because of the long history of limited ath-
letic opportunity for females. See supra note 2. The avowed legislative purpose
to rectify past inequities and provide an equal opportunity for members of both
sexes to participate in athletics, MINN. STAT. § 126.21(1) (1980), will be better
met if the female athlete is afforded relief from the separate sex athletic team
system.
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 126.21(1) (1980).
104. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-15c (West Supp. 1981); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2520 (1981); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.3 (Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 76, § 5 (Miche/Law.
Co-op. 1978); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5004(a) (3) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
105. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02-11 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-111 (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-7-1 (Supp. 1981).
106. See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 497 F.2d 1292, 1298-99
(8th Cir. 1973); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977).
107. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(j) (Supp. 1981) ("Places of public
accommodation" include any place or establishment which is supported di-
rectly or indirectly by government funds).
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sory sex stereotypes resulting from a segregation of the sexes
in group activities. 08 Because of the powerful socializing role
of interscholastic athletics, 09 the underlying objectives of gen-
eral state sex discrimination or civil rights legislation require
that such statutes be construed to apply to sex discriminatory
athletic programs.
A female athlete may invoke state constitutional or statu-
tory provisions in an effort to establish her right to compete for
a position on an exclusively male athletic team. Fourteen
states have amended their constitutions to include provisions
expressly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex.110
Such provisions may provide strong support for the female ath-
lete's position. In addition, a number of states have enacted
legislation prohibiting sex discrimination which can be con-
strued to apply to interscholastic athletics. These state provi-
sions are all of recent origin, and reflect a growing consensus
that efforts must be undertaken to ensure that females are pro-
vided an equal opportunity to participate in public educational
programs. Because of the strong influence of athletics on the
formation and maintenance of traditional sex-role stereotyping,
and the resulting impact on individual growth and potential,"'1
these provisions should be construed to provide relief to the fe-
male athlete competing in a sex discriminatory interscholastic
athletic program.
MI. CONCLUSION
The exceptional female athlete's right to compete for a
male athletic team in a school district operating separate sex
teams may be found to exist under the Federal Constitution,
Title IX, and state constitutional or statutory provisions. Prior
applications of these doctrines to the female athlete's claims
have been discordant and poorly reasoned. This Note proposes
that such claims should be resolved with reference to the social
policy against sex discrimination underlying the development
of the law.
108. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 197 (1975) (statement of Rep. McKinney).
109. Id. at 287 (statement by M. Dunkle, representative of the Women's Eq-
uity Action League (WEAL)) (implications of Title IX go far beyond the ath-
letic arena-athletic competition is a powerful socializing agent in our society).
110. See supra note 93.
111. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1975) (statement of Rep. McKinney).
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The major barrier that the exceptional female athlete must
ultimately face is the belief of some members of our society
that coeducational athletic teams are improper. Although Con-
gress, several states, and the courts have demonstrated a policy
against sex discrimination, the emphasis on overall equality for
separate sex programs may permit a school to restrict the ex-
ceptional female athlete to a female team allegedly to ensure
that all female athletes have an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in athletics. This focus on equality of athletic opportunity
for a sex, rather than for individual athletes, can serve only to
perpetuate any present differences in the athletic abilities and
opportunities for high school female and male athletes.
